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Much of the debate surrounding contemporary studies of terrorism focuses upon
transnational terrorism. However, historical and contemporary evidence suggests that
domestic terrorism is a more prevalent and pressing concern. A formal microeconomic
model of terrorism is utilized here to understand acts of political violence in a domestic
context within the domain of democratic governance.This article builds a very basic
microeconomic model of terrorist decision making to hypothesize how a democratic
government might influence the sorts of strategies that terrorists use. Mathematical
models have been used to explain terrorist behavior in the past. However, the bulk of
inquires in this area have only focused on the relationship between terrorists and the
government, or amongst terrorists themselves. Central to the interpretation of the terrorist
conflict presented here is the idea that voters (or citizens) are also one of the important
determinants of how a government will respond to acts of terrorism.
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Variance, Violence, and
Democracy: A Basic
Microeconomic Model of
Terrorism
By John A. Sautter

Introduction
Much of the debate surrounding contemporary studies of terrorism
focuses upon transnational terrorism. However, historical and contemporary evidence suggests that domestic terrorism is a more prevalent and
pressing concern. A formal microeconomic model of terrorism is utilized
here to understand acts of political violence in a domestic context within
the domain of democratic governance.
Terrorism is the use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce for
political purposes.1 Unlike purely conventional military conflict where
two opposing armies meet on a battlefield, terrorism focuses violence
directly on civilians to affect political change through altering public opinion.2 Within the modern day context, terrorism as a calculated political
tool must be thought of within democratic institutions, and for good reason. History shows not only that an insurgent or terrorist organization
can influence electoral outcomes, but that as a society becomes more
democratic rates of terrorism tend to increase.3
This article builds a very basic microeconomic model of terrorist decision
making to hypothesize how a democratic government might influence the
sorts of strategies that terrorists use. Mathematical models have been
used to explain terrorist behavior in the past.4 However, the bulk of
inquires in this area have only focused on the relationship between terrorists and the government, or amongst terrorists themselves.5 Central to the
interpretation of the terrorist conflict presented here is the idea that voters (or citizens) are also one of the important determinants of how a government will respond to acts of terrorism.

Domestic Terrorism and Democracy
A major focus of terrorism studies, especially since September 11, 2001,
has been on ideologically motivated, transnational terrorism. However,
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whether one views this topic historically or in the contemporary context,
transnational and religiously motivated incidents are much less frequent
than might at first be obvious. An examination of the ITERATE collection
of acts of terrorism during the past thirty years shows that a majority of
incidents was neither international in scope nor initiated by religiously
motivated groups.6 Furthermore, most terrorist acts over this period were
caused by individuals indigenous to the state in which they occurred, with
the victims being largely from those states as well.7 Without a doubt,
domestic terrorism is as important as the transnational case.
There are distinct features that set domestic models of terrorism apart
from transnational ones. First, the idea that the victim and the terrorist
are from different populations, or countries, is either the assumption
made in an international focus, or the issue is completely ignored. In
domestic terrorism it is often the case that clandestine groups recruit
from all parts of society and share the same nationality with those that
they are attacking.8 Second, transnational models of terrorism rarely, if
ever, model the main tool of violent political groups, terror itself. It is
often treated as an intangible variable that cannot be accounted for.9
Indeed, in the transnational context it may very well be impossible to
place such a concept into the workings of an economic model, however
important it may be to policy outcomes. Finally, asymmetric information
and signaling is very different in each.10 Domestic terrorism, as conceived
here, is a method of signaling used by a political dissident to attempt to
directly sway a citizenry, whereas transnational terrorism is usually conceived as indirect influence.
Research has demonstrated the importance of democratic institutions in
explaining the frequency of terrorism. The prevalence of democratic institutions has a positive relationship with incidences of terrorism.11 This is
generally ascribed to liberal rules and freedoms under a democratic
regime, which allow terrorist organizations to organize freely. Indeed, evidence suggests that as government institutional obstruction to democratic
expression decreases, so do incidences of terrorism.12 One way to think of
this is by understanding that individuals will be more likely to take advantage of the political process as opposed to violent opposition to it when
the costs of political participation are much lower.13 When there are fewer
obstructions to participation, its costs are inherent lower.
The model developed below assumes three different agents. There are terrorists (t), voters (v) and politicians (g).14 Terrorists aim to commit illegal
acts to further their political beliefs. Voters want to maximize safety and
stability. Politicians desire re-election and will optimize government antiterrorism policy in order to maximize re-election. A democratic system of
40
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government with direct election for representative government is
assumed in the model. In short, terrorists attack voter-citizens, voters
decide their government, and the government adopts a policy toward terrorists.

Terrorist Utility
T = T (D, π, G ) - C (D*)

(1)

A terrorist's utility is a function of three different variables. Where D is
some amount of damage that a terrorist would like to commit and D* is
the chosen amount of damage that they will attempt. The cost constraint
C (.), is a function of the chosen damage that the terrorists will attempt to
commit. π is the probability of successfully completing the intended act or
acts of terrorism. G is a proxy for the mean government policy in the past.
Government policy includes counterterrorism efforts, implementing
security measures or any other government activity that was implemented
to retaliate against or protect from terrorist activities. We assume that
and

∂T
∂D

∂T
are both > 0, or that a terrorist's utility is increasing in both the
∂π

amount of damage that they are able to inflict, as well as, the probability
of success. However,

∂T
< 0, or that as the government policy toward ter∂G

rorists is increased, a terrorist will get disutility.
Finding the first order condition:
∂T (D, π, G) = C' (D* )
∂D

(2)

The first order condition shows that a terrorist is constrained by the cost
of their chosen amount of damage. D* is the theoretical combination of
terrorist acts, Di, (i = 1,2,...), that amount to different ways of committing
violence, or,
m

*

D =

∑ Di ( G (D), π)

(3)

i

A terrorist will maximize his utility by choosing the optimal D* that solves
equation (2) given a certain probability of success and the current government policy toward terrorism. The government policy from the terrorist
perspective is a function of the mean of all past violent activities, D.
41
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Voter Utility
Vi = V (D*, π, G, ρ, θ (u, D*))

(4)

Voter, or citizen, utility is some function of the same variable inputs: D*,
π, G. Rho is a theoretical parameter that measures the rate at which voters
discount past acts of terrorism over time, where 0 < ρ < 1.15 This models
the behavior that a voter weights the future much more than the past.
Prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, most Americans did
not perceive a terrorist threat, though the risk of a successful attack was
obviously high. Conversely, the overhaul of airline security regulations, a
new emphasis on the threat posed by terrorists in governmental intelligence organizations and the establishment of a Homeland Security
Administration have significantly reduced the danger of future terrorist
attacks that abounded before 9/11. However, the public perceives that the
risk of future attacks is in fact higher. Voters are assumed to place more
emphasis on future risks than they do on the whole for past events.
As a stochastic variable, u represents all other things in society that could
become more important to a voting public than a threat posed by terrorism, including economic conditions, erosion of civil liberties or corruption
in government. The parameter θ (.) is some function of u between zero
2

∂θ
∂θ
and one, so that ∂ u < 0 and ∂ D* > 0. The first term illustrates that
∂u

when damage is held constant other issues in the political atmosphere
begin to outweigh the importance of inputs D*, π, G in the voter utility
function, sending θ J0. However, the second term denotes that there is a
positive second derivative with respect to D* and u, showing that theta
increases when there is a simultaneous increase in both D* and u. This
makes θ increasing in damage even if other political issues are concurrently in the political debate. It is assumed that in the absence of an
increase in D, u, will rise over time as other issues enter into the political
landscape. For the purposes of explaining the model, θ is set to one in
equation (4) so that a focus can be placed on the variables D*, π, G.16
Voter maximization is also affected by a chance constraint that takes into
account the probability of damage.
Pr { D* ≥ G (D)} ≥ π

(5)

Equation (5) is a probability density function that ensures that the probability of receiving positive damage: D* - G (D) > 0, is greater than or equal
42
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to π. In other words, the terrorist act is greater than the historic mean of
government policy, thereby incurring damage. D* is a random variable
that, while in the voter utility function, represents the amount of economic damage or violence that terrorists have committed during the current round of attacks. Voters have information regarding the historic
mean and standard deviation of D*since they are aware of the terrorist's
density function and the variance of their past acts of violence. While past
violent acts of terror provide information to voters on the scope of D*, it
should only be regarded as a theoretical general guide to them. For example, if one knows that in the past suicide bombers have ridden buses, this
informs one on the inherent risks of riding the bus. However, this general
knowledge does not inform one of the specific time, day and place of an
act of terror that is random for the typical citizen.
In the chance constraint,

∂D *
< 0, indicating that as the amount of damage
∂π

increases, the probability of success decreases. This follows from the fact
that generally attacks that kill a larger number of people or inflict more
economic damage are normally more complex, costly and involve a higher
probability of failure. Equation (5) can be re-written as:17
[Pr {D* > G} > π] ≈ σ D * γ (1 - π) + μ D * - G(D)

(6)

Which combined with equation (4) gives the following voter utility
function:
Vi = V (D*, π, G; ρ, θ (u)) + G(D) - σ D * γ (1 - π) - μ D *

(7)

Where σ D *and μ D *are the standard deviation and mean of D*; and
γ (1 - π) is a function that delineates the number of standard deviations
that D* must be from D, the mean of all past damage, in order to satisfy
the constraint.
Voters are interested in safety and national security. Though D*, π, G, are
exogenous to the voter's utility function, they are seen as maximizing utility when the government pursues a policy, G, that provides for the most
stability to society. Following a terrorist attack, voters will evaluate the
government based on their perceptions of how the administration
responded to the attack. Therefore, voters feel the effect of the following
maximization problem:

max
G

Vi = V (D*, π, G, ρ, θ (u)) + G(D) - σ D * γ (1 - π) - μ D *

(8)
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Solving for the first order condition in equation (8):
∂Vi
∂V . ∂D* ∂V . ∂π
∂V ∂σ D*
∂μ D* ∂G . ∂D
=
+
+
γ
'
(1
π
)
∂G
∂ D* ∂ G
∂π ∂G
∂G ∂G
∂ G + ∂ D ∂ G = 0 (9)

Equation (9) describes the effect on voters' utility with a change in government policy in response to a terrorist attack. For this example, theta is
presumed to be equal to one.
Each term describes how a voter reacts to the damage perpetrated by terrorists in light of the government response to the damage and can be
interpreted as either an expression of sensitivity to the terrorist violence
(alpha) or as a sensitivity to the government response (beta). Accordingly,
D*
D*
αi = ∂σ γ ' (1 - π) + ∂μ

∂G

(10)

∂G

and,
*

∂V ∂D
∂V
∂V ∂π
∂G
βi = ∂ D* . ∂ G + ∂ G + ∂ π . ∂ G + ∂ D . ∂D
∂G

(11)

Equation (10) is the summation of partial derivatives that equal alpha or
the sensitivity to terrorist violence, and equation (11), beta, represents the
terms that are equal to the sensitivity to the government response. The
difference in alpha and beta, βi - αi = 0, will always be equal to zero. If it
did not equal zero, then the government can be understood as not
responding to the political violence in a proportionate and effective manner. Therefore in this model, it is assumed that the government will continue to play the game round to round, and will always have a response.
The significance of this measure is where these two sides of voter utility
meet in policy space. As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 below, the important feature of this model is its ability to show why terrorists use the
methods that they choose. By expanding the variance and decreasing their
mean level of violence, terrorists can decrease government response and
increase their signaling potency on the average voter or citizen.
Terrorists are attempting to cause fear and panic in order to sway citizens
into pressuring the government into making political concessions. Each
one of the expressions in alpha causes negative utility for the voter. The
∂σ D*
first term,
γ ' < 0 is a kind of "terror" term that reflects how an increase
∂G

in the standard deviation of acts of damage changes with respect to government policy. It illustrates the disutility that a voter receives from an
D*
increase in the randomness of violence. The second term, ∂μ < 0 repre∂G

sents a "strength" of terror term and depicts the change in the mean level
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of violence associated with terrorism. All of the expressions in the α equation are decreasing in government policy.
The β equation models the voter sensitivity to the government policy. The
*
first term, ∂V . ∂D < 0, can be called the "violence" term and represents
∂ D*

∂G

the negative utility that voters receive from the act of damage and the government's initial response to the violence. The next term, ∂V . ∂π >0,
∂π ∂G
demonstrates that voters' gain utility from seeing the terrorists' probability of success decrease as the amount of government policy toward terrorism increases.

∂V
> 0, is a "safety" term. Voters garner positive utility
∂G

from the reassuring feeling and stability that an increase in government
policy brings to society. The final expression in the β equation, ∂G . ∂D >
∂D

∂G

0, is an "updating" term that represents the way voters garner utility from
seeing the government change its policy to match the new threat posed by
an increase in the E (D*), or the new expected future value of damage.

Government Utility
P = P (ε ; δ )
n

n

Where: ε = ε (

∑αi ( D , π, G), ∑ βi ( D*, π, G, ρ, θ))
*

i

(12)

i

The government utility function is only concerned with getting re-elected.
The incumbent government will optimize G, given D* and π, which are
both exogenous to P (.), so as to maximize ε, the chance of re-election.
Delta is a parameter that represents the rate that office holders discount
the future, where 0 < δ < 1.18 Unlike voters, who place more emphasis on
the future, politicians are assumed to place more importance on the
present. Indeed, if not elected in the forthcoming round of elections, the
government will have no say in the policy toward terrorists anyway. In
effect, the sum of voters' utility is nested within the government's utility
function and expressed by the way that voters feel toward the government. The parameter "n" is any hypothetical number of voters in a state
and "i" represents each individual voter.
Government utility maximization is also constrained by a chance constraint that takes into account an incumbent's chances of getting reelected.
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Pr { ∑ β >
i

n

∑α } > ε

(13)

i

Equation (13) is a condition that ensures the government will maximize
its counterterrorism policy in an attempt to make the following equality
hold: βi - αi = 0. The government desires to make ε, their chance at reelection, equal to one. In other words, the current administration desires
to maximize the probability of staying in office. This is dependent on their
ability to defeat the terrorists. If the equality stated above does not hold,
the government is seen to have lost its ability to fight the terrorists and
would thus not be re-elected to office.

Interpreting the Model
An increase in damage only changes the government crackdowns by a
marginal amount as compared to a change in the level of α,19 which would
bring a similar change in G and D. An increase in the probability of success for the terrorists arises from an increase in variance of violence, shifting Beta away from the G = D* line. The flatter the slope of the Beta
expansion path, or the higher proportion of damage D compared to the
government policy of G(D*), the higher the probability that violence will
succeed with a smaller crackdown from the government. Alpha represents
a constrained probability of success, which is inherently determined by
the choices of the terrorists in the strategy they will use. The decision to
pursue easier targets versus more complex and dangerous ones alters the
level of the alpha expansion path in the policy space.

Figure 1: Graph showing the effect of an increase in variance of violent
acts in policy space.
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A change in the mean level of violence will raise alpha, increasing D. However, notice that under this form of damage policy the terrorists can
expect a substantially larger crackdown from the government than if they
had increased their variance. Also, notice that a higher mean lowers the
probability of success, which would eventually begin to push the beta line
toward the G = D* line, making the government reaction even closer to
being the same as the increase in damage. Or, in terms of Figure 1 and
Figure 2, we would say that:
D1* - D1 > D2* - D2 and, G2* - G2 > G1* - G1
Terrorists will desire to keep their mean level of violence low, so as to
avoid a costly government attack. There will be a better chance of committing more violence and terror on the general public by adopting a strategy
that increases the variance of attacks while decreasing its mean level.

Figure 2: Graph showing the effect of an increase in the mean level of
violence in policy space.

Conclusion
Democratic governments should deal with terrorists early and with impunity before they are allowed to gather enough resources for a larger attack.
This may seem obvious. However, there is not always the necessary public
support to provide resources for a police action against insurgents or to
enact the necessary security laws to avert future attacks. What this model
suggests is that the government should undertake such actions even when
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there is little public support. This conclusion is somewhat at odds with the
notion of democracy being a form of government that protects civil liberties. In many respects, this is the paradox of domestic terrorism and
democracy: how to provide security for a citizenry when some of those
you wish to protect are hostile to their own government.
The connection between electoral government and terrorism is important. The study of how each party involved in the three-way relationship
depicted here reacts to the actions of the other two parties can provide
insight into how best to manufacture policies aimed at curbing terrorist
incidents. One of the most striking results of this investigation is the basic
realization that there are trade-offs in a democratic system that a terrorist
or insurgent group must make between large attacks which draw the
scorn of the public, and thereby the government retribution; as compared
to small, more varied, attacks that harass the populace but do not create a
large government backlash.
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2

∂θ
2 > 0. This condition allows theta to increase at an increasing rate when dam∂ D*
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than smaller ones.

17 Pr {D* > G} > π, therefore if we treat both G and D as normalized random variables
we get the following, Pr {D* - μ > G - μ } > π, where D* - μ is a normalized random

σ

σ

σ

D* - μ
variable with a distribution of some function F= F [ σ ]. Therefore, it follows
that we can also say that F -1 = k. Therefore, our equation can be expressed as
1 - k [G - μ ] > π, which rearranging once again gives us the following,

σ

[ G - μ ] > k (1 - π). Finally, through a little algebra we can express the constraint in

σ

the following manner: σ.k (1 − π) + μ − G > 0, which allows for the voter utility function to be constrained by the terrorists' manner and probability of success.
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the following form: δ = ( 1 ).

1+r

19 The α expansion path is increasing at a decreasing rate because of the nature of the
relationship between the standard deviation and mean of damage. Since,

∂μ
> 0,
∂σ

or as the mean increases so does the absolute value of the standard deviation of
2

∂μ
< 0, because as the mean
∂ σ2
level of damage increases, its probability of success decreases. Conversely, the β
violence. However, the second derivative is negative,

expansion path (the government) is linear and additive.
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